Dating after age 65 social security disability
olsen is with the office of retirement policy, office of retirement and disability policy (ordp), social security administration (ssa). if she defers receipt until the normal retirement age (nra), she will receive a monthly amount equal to 100 percent of the deceased husband's pia. these statements have led to earnings being corrected at earlier ages, when workers can provide evidence of the wages missing from or erroneously posted to their record. the denominator is the number of divorced women in the age category and year in all states. this includes federal government employees hired before january 1, 1984, and state and local government employees hired after march 31, 1986, or whose employment after this date is subject to special conditions of the social security act (cfr 2008). the administrative needs of ssa and other agencies have changed over time and, as a result, there have been numerous changes to the main source of ssa's earnings data, which is known as the master earnings file (mef). beginning in 1966, payroll taxes were collected for hi, generally from those who were also covered by the social security program (ssa 2008). when her second husband dies, she will receive a full widow benefit of ,000 for the last 65 months of her life. today, employers can go directly to ssa's business services online26 to submit w-2s electronically and to request verification of employees' names and ssns through the social security number verification system. there is an increase in the marriage rate of these widows when the law became effective in 1979 implying that many women would have liked to marry, but did not do so because of the penalty in the social security system. these findings suggest that the age-60 remarriage rule affects the timing of marriage and has the most influence on women who are very close to age 60. this possibility is highlighted by mcgill and others (1996) who write: "[t]oday any spouse's benefit in excess of the mandated benefit [authors' emphasis] qualified preretirement survivor annuity tends to be an explicitly stated benefit, as described below, payable to the surviving spouse as long as she or he lives, but sometimes it is subject to termination in the event of remarriage prior to a stipulated age, such as age 60. noted earlier, nonfarm and nonprofessional self-employed workers were added to the program by the 1950 social security amendments (self-employed farm and professional workers were added later) (see chart 1). nevertheless, many widows do not wait until age 60 to marry. therefore, any policy that affects widows' marriage decisions may also be affecting divorced women's decisions. examine the question of whether social security rules governing remarriage affect behavior, we examine the rates of remarriage of women around age 60 under current as well as past social security eligibility rules..) 101-508, enacted in 1990, the taxable maximum for medicare in 1991 was increased to 5,000 (the taxable maximum for social security that year was ,400) and was to be indexed to average wages thereafter. that there appear to be drops in the marriage rate at age 59 and corresponding rises at age 60 for widows we further investigate hypothesis 2 using the trends in marriage counts within 24 months of age 60.: michael compson, office of research, evaluation, and statistics, social security administration. owing to limited storage capacity and the prohibitive costs of converting early earnings data to an electronic format, data for 1937 to 1950 are only available as two aggregate numbers for each worker:21 total social security taxable earnings for 1937–1950 and total qcs for 1947–1950. data are also used for certain statistical publications and data files, such as earnings and employment data for workers covered by social security and medicare, by state and county; benefits and earnings public use-file, 2004; and certain tables in the annual statistical supplement to the social security bulletin. before 1965, widows lost eligibility for widow benefits if they remarried at any time.: the 1979 law eliminated the penalty for remarriage after age 60, thereby raising the benefit of waiting for widows under 60 and reducing the cost of remarriage at age 60 or older. the w-2 information includes the employer identification number (ein),37 oasdi and medicare taxable wages, and total wages reportable as irs-taxable income on form 1040 (currently shown in box 1 of form w-2, this amount includes wages above the oasdi taxable maximum, noncovered wages, and deferred-compensation distributions, but does not include deferred-compensation contributions). the detail segment includes a posted section that contains earnings that are subject to social security or medicare taxes and an unposted section that contains related earnings information (such as railroad wages, noncovered earnings, deferred compensation, and hsa contributions). if an individual had some railroad earnings, but not enough to qualify for railroad retirement benefits, these earnings would apply toward his or her social security benefit. wyrick revealed the incredible story of thousands of senior citizens living together 'in sin' because legal marriage might deprive them of pensions or social security..In addition to providing empirical evidence for economic theory, understanding the role that social security plays in determining marital status is relevant for at least three reasons. we hypothesize that the 1979 law would decrease the marriage rate for women under age 60 and increase the marriage rate for women aged 60 years or older. we assume the woman claims her widow benefit on the earlier husband's account at age 60 and switches to a higher benefit at a later date if one materializes (for example, if she outlives her most recent husband and the widow benefit on his record is the highest). this leaves her ineligible for social security benefits for the first 24 months after attaining age 60.
Dating after age 65 social security earnings
" a "quarter of coverage" (qc) is the basic unit for determining whether a worker is insured under the social security program.: the numerator is the weighted number of marriages among divorced women in the age category and year from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. for 2009, social security taxes are collected on earnings up to 6,800. as more employers began to submit their wage reports via electronic media, only one data processing center was needed. "taxes and transfers: their effects on the decision to end a marriage. the unposted section has no amounts in the social security or medicare taxable fields. dickert-conlin (1999) finds that, conditional on marriage penalties implicit in the welfare system, couples with higher marriage tax penalties are more likely to separate. thus, there are strong incentives to wait until after age 60 to marry. reducing the marriage penalty is likely to increase the number of remarriages, and the additional cost to the social security system would be relatively modest. the types and numbers of workers covered by social security have changed over time as more categories of workers have been added to the rolls (see chart 1). for the "typical" person in our group, marriage prior to age 60 leads to the loss of ,000 in benefits (this is the median difference between the present value amount associated with early marriage and the amount associated with delayed marriage). one final question for future research is how large the effects of this law are relative to other determinants of marriage..9 part c (medicare advantage) and part d (prescription drug plan) have since been added to the medicare program. these are only from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. under current law, there is no penalty if the remarriage occurs at 60 years of age or later. in theory, this reduced the penalty for remarriage for those who were at least age 60 and increased the incentive to delay remarriage until age 60. prior to 1979, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the percent differences from 1968, the baseline year, are the same for those under age 60 and those at least age 60 in each year. in general, during this period there is no way to break out the amount of covered earnings from wages and salary, self-employment income, or earnings from agriculture. the fact that the change in behavior was not as large in the years prior to a significant change in the social security rules and does not seem to be present for divorced women who are not generally covered by these rules adds credence to our attribution. suppose a widow considers marriage to a man two years her senior. the wages paid to those under mqge are classified in the mef as hi-taxable earnings. qc was earned for each 0 of reported covered earnings from all sources (such as wages, tips, and self-employment) up to the annual limit of four in 1978. as of december 2005, about three-fourths of earnings in the mef detail segment were taxable wages from form w-2, with the rest consisting of noncovered w-2 wages, self-employment income, and delinquent w-2 earnings. none of this literature focuses on the marriage decisions of the elderly, despite marriage penalties in the social security program and the economically vulnerable status of this group. the final change occurred in april of 1983 when the legislation passed allowing surviving divorced spouses to remarry after age 60 and still claim a full survivor benefit. this allows them to remain insured for disability and retirement purposes (the qcs are allocated to specific quarters to best advantage the claimant). the welfare effects associated with this behavior are more profound than those of women who simply delay marriage. of trustees of the federal old-age and survivors insurance and disability insurance trust funds. there is evidence that the passage of the law in 1977 caused some women to delay marriage until the law became effective. but she fears that getting married soon, as she and her fiancè planned, could cost her a fortune because of the rules that govern social security.. a growing literature finds that taxes are correlated with the timing of events including birth (dickert-conlin and chandra 1999), marriage (alm and whittington 1997; gelardi 1996), capital gains realization (burman and randolph 1994), and charitable contributions (randolph 1995).
Dating after age 65 social security benefits
this is the basis for our assertion that these women remarried prior to age 60. they restrict their multivariate analysis of widows to widows under age 60, because there are too few remarriages in the age 60 or older sample. existence of the age restriction for remarriage seems intended to ensure a well-targeted system—one that disallows widows who have another means of support through marriage.. beginning in 1991, the amount of earnings taxable under the social security program and under the medicare program differed.. other literatures address this efficiency concept, but the marriage literature largely ignores it.], which supports the possibility that widows over age 60 delayed marriage until their marriage penalty was eliminated. the widow may choose to defer receipt of benefits until after age 60 and receive a higher monthly benefit. the previous question raises the issue of what the alternative to marriage is for widows.. also, note that child-in-care widow benefits terminate upon marriage, so an early marriage may have also reduced child-in-care social security benefits prior to age 60. in all cases, the marriage rates for widows under age 60 is further below the baseline year than the rate for widows who are at least age 60.: weighted number of marriages among divorced women in the month and year category. our independent variables include single-year age dummies, with age 50 omitted; and an interaction between the age dummies and whether the time period is 1979 or later.: divorced women do not face such high benefits of waiting until age 60, therefore these same trends should not exist for them. such people will potentially be eligible for widow benefits from social security when they reach age 60. marriage rates for the widows between the ages of 50 and 59 are declining around the law change, which is the expected response to the law change. however, we could not easily separate whether the law decreased marriage rates for those under age 60 or increased marriage rates for those aged 60 or older. one proposal for further reducing the marriage penalty would be to lower the age after which a marriage is disregarded from age 60 to, say, age 50. this tax deduction provides similar social security and income tax treatment of employees, employers, and self-employed workers (ssa 1990). the earnings test applies only until the month that full retirement age is attained. the influence of anecdotal evidence on policy and a persistent policy concern for impoverished widows, there is no rigorous empirical analysis of the influence of social security on remarriage behavior." the master earnings file was created for the purpose of calculating benefits, but as corson predicted, it has been used more broadly for improving the administration of the social security program. approximately 90 percent of the wage reports received by ssa each year are posted to the mef without difficulty. present discounted value (pdv) of social security benefits at age 60, by age at remarriage. this analysis suggests that the marriage penalty in social security has the most influence on women who are very close to age 60.. 103-66 repealed the medicare taxable maximum beginning in 1994, and required hi payroll taxes to be paid on all wages and self-employment earnings.. for example, among unmarried women aged 15 to 44, the marriage rate fell from 147. washington, dc: social security administration, office of retirement and disability policy. amounts for all other years were determined under the automatic adjustment provision of the social security act, established in the 1972 social security amendments (for more information on these amendments, see http://www. percent each) under title viii of the original social security act. dependent variable is the natural log of the monthly count of marriages, relative to the 60th birthday. ssa can use it only to record wages and cannot share it with any other federal agency.
Dating after age 65 social security tax our denominator is an estimate of the number of women at risk for marriage in these groups from the march current population survey (cps), a nationally representative household survey conducted by the census bureau. this article examines the history of the data, how the data are collected and entered into the ssa computer systems, the information contained in the data, some limitations and complexities of using the data for research purposes, and how the agency uses the data. in addition to calculating social security benefits, mef data are used for policy analysis and research both within and outside ssa. deferred compensation is an arrangement in which a portion of an employee's wages are paid out in a year after that in which they are actually earned. if a widow(er) remarries before age 60, she or he forfeits the benefit and, therefore, faces a marriage penalty. vertical lines denote the year in which the current remarriage rule passed into law (december 1977) and became effective (january 1979). an optical scanner was installed at ssa in 1966 to read and automatically transfer to magnetic tape a significant percentage of the typewritten paper wage reports sent in by employers (cronin 1985). however, as the use of the ssn expanded for tax and banking purposes, people began acquiring ssns at earlier ages. year, ssa processes about 245 million employee wage reports submitted by about 6.. beginning in 1996, the nchs only collected aggregate marriage and divorce counts.. one extreme implication of this law is that a widow could remarry any time before age 60, legally divorce at age 59 years and 364 days, and remarry again (the same person) on her 60th birthday without losing eligibility for widow benefits. to view an original social security wage record, see http://www. however, this descriptive analysis does not account for other factors, in particular, an overall decline in marriage rates during this time. with regard to how widows conceptualize lifetime penalties, we believe it is likely that they use expectations about length of life (as opposed to use of age-specific mortality probabilities). in section ii we first describe the relevant social security laws and present an analysis of the size of the penalties under current law. the widow does not wait until age 60 to marry, she cannot claim the widow benefit on her first husband's record. section iv provides evidence from the national center for health statistics/vital statistics (nchs/vs), the primary data used in our analysis, that social security influences marriage behavior. conditional on the time trend, all age categories at age 60 years or older are more likely to marry in the post-1979 law period..15 the mef oasdi taxable earnings field only includes deferred compensation for social security–covered workers whose earnings are below the taxable maximum from 1984 forward. for example, in 1951 the combined old-age and survivors insurance (oasi) tax rate for employers and employees was 3. the benefit and cost vary depending on the age at which the widow is considering remarriage. by the late 1970s, electronic capabilities had increased dramatically from the original punch cards and magnetic tape used by ssa, enabling the agency to store the additional w-2 information (see the data available section for the full list of variables contained in the mef today). in addition, a marriage reported to vs may occur in a state where the bride and groom do not reside, so the at risk group is not simply in the mra states. only since 1979 have widow(er)s been allow to marry at or after age 60 and not face reductions in benefit amounts. this paper we focus on an age restriction for remarriage in the social security system to determine if individuals respond to economic incentives for marriage. these credits may qualify individuals for higher social security benefits. from 1978 through 2005, about three-quarters of wages came from regular employment, while most of the rest came from tips and from employment in the military, state and local government, agriculture, households, and railroads (pattison 2007). for an explanation of how the self-employed pay social security and medicare taxes, see http://www. self-employed fiscal year taxpayers can receive an advantage compared to self-employed calendar year taxpayers at the social security trust funds' expense. million persons drawing aged widow(er) benefits from social security. since 1990, ssa has collected additional information on the aggregate value of workers' deferred compensation from form w-2 to include in the national average wage calculation, which is used to calculate the annual taxable maximum (and other wage-indexed amounts for the oasdi program).
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first, a spouse benefit cannot be claimed until age 62 (and, then, only if her husband receives a social security benefit). a widow who remarries before age 60 may have higher lifetime social security benefits than a similar widow who never remarries. a related topic is whether or not the social security administration can monitor marital status. "a house of her own: old age assistance and the living arrangements of older nonmarried women. testimony before the house committee on ways and means, subcommittee on social security. this is some evidence that economic status affects family structure, but it does not isolate the effect of social security. for later birth cohorts, the nra is gradually rising to age 67. for the full text of the original social security act of 1935, see http://www. "the influence of tax law changes on the timing of marriages: a two-country analysis. foremost, earnings data were first collected for the sole purpose of computing social security benefits. the ee-er files also contain age, sex, race, and deferred-compensation contributions variables. the previous analysis, it is clear that the 1979 law change affected the marriage rates of widows. the denominator is the number of widows in the age category and year in all states. in 1979, the year the law became effective, the marriage rate was 20 percent higher than the baseline, the largest positive deviation in our sample period. the benefits would be restored if the second marriage ends in death, divorce or annulment. finally, to put this amount in year 2000 dollars, we adjust for price changes from the date the remarried widow turns age 60 to the year 2000 (assuming a 3 percent annual rate of inflation). original social security act, which was enacted in 1935, required that monthly benefits be paid to qualified individuals aged 65 or older based on their wages from employment before age 65. first, there is evidence that marriage is positively correlated with health outcomes, life expectancy, and economic well-being (waite 1995), yet we do not know if social security influences the decision of whether or not to be married.. department of health and human services (1985) only a small percentage (17 percent) of divorced women entering their retirement years receive surviving divorced spouse benefits. of the federal government pension plans also have age restrictions for remarriage without penalty. consistent with the previous analysis, for those who remarry in the months before their 60th birthday, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the percentage difference in marriage rates from the baseline are the same in the two time periods. however, there are 10 months after age 59 (60th birthday, +1, +2, +3, +8, +12, +18, +22, +23, +24 months) where the marriage counts are statistically and economically higher in the post-1979 law period relative to the pre-law period. for the full list of taxable maximum changes, as well as social security and medicare tax rates and the rates paid by the self-employed up to the maximum amounts, see ssa (2008), table 2..5 other groups not covered by the original social security act include agricultural workers, domestic servants, casual laborers, maritime workers, employees of federal and state governments or their instrumentalities, those workers employed after reaching age 65, and employees of religious, educational, charitable, and nonprofit organizations (ssb 1938). magnetic tapes or other files with personal identifiers are retained in secured storage areas accessible only to authorized personnel. a clear pattern in the period since 1979 also shows low marriage counts in the months immediately preceding widows' 60th birthdays followed by large increases in the number of marriages on widows' 60th birthdays..Remarriage at any time makes the widow potentially eligible for spouse benefits on her new husband's work record, so marriage is unlikely to leave a woman ineligible for social security. additional mef records are created for a w-2 if it includes earnings above the social security–taxable maximum in 1991 and later (the excess earnings would be hi-taxable), deferred compensation in 1990 and later, or tips.: numerator is weighted number of marriages among widows in the age category and year from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. research on the relationship between income taxes and marriage decisions suggests that the income tax system has small but significant effects on marriage and divorce decisions. the name and ssn do not match, even after ssa has performed its computer matching routines, the wages can not be credited to the individual's account.
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.45 a separate earnings test applies for the year in which a person reaches full retirement age. Security Administration Research, Statistics, and Policy AnalysisDating, relationships and romance should be celebrated in the golden years. in actuality, social security benefits and pias are adjusted for inflation over time. a small percentage of ssns are still requested by working-age and older persons, mostly immigrants. we also include year dummies to account for a secular time trend in marriage rates, with the omitted category of 1968.. because an analysis of a single year of age can lead to small sample sizes, we benchmarked the 1990 cps against 1990 census data and found that the results are not qualitatively different. however, a widow who remarries after reaching age 60 retains full claim on these benefits. these results strongly suggest that the marriage rate decreases as widows approach age 60. that is, a widow who remarries before age 60 has no claim to the widow benefits (so long as the remarriage remains intact) and therefore faces a marriage penalty. the punch card data were entered onto the ledger accounts of individual wage earners and checked against employer totals for accuracy (corson 1938). the post-1979 law change period, the marriage rate at age 58 is 65 percent lower than the marriage rate at the baseline age, while the marriage rate is 101 percent lower than that at the baseline age for women at age 59 and back to 67 percent lower than the baseline age at age 60. the median estimated value of social security benefits for persons in our analysis group is 1,000. the conversationto find out more about facebook commenting please read the conversation guidelines and faqssocial security headaches hit some baby boomers hard susan tompor , detroit free press personal finance columnist. for example, widows may claim survivor benefits as early as age 60, two years before they can claim their retired-worker benefits. example illustrates the social security rules and the potential size of the marriage penalty. until 1991, if an individual's wages from employment reached or exceeded the oasdi taxable maximum, ssa would not collect any self-employment information for the worker during that year. "the accuracy of survey-reported marital status: evidence from survey records matched to social security records. first, not all widowed women face social security penalties for remarriage. the summary segment contains annual oasdi-taxable wages and tips and self-employment earnings from 1951 to the present; cumulative taxable earnings for 1937–1950, 1951–1977, and 1978 to date; annual information on mqge from 1983 to date; cumulative qcs for 1947–1950 and 1951–1977; annual qcs for 1951–1977 (qcs from 1978 to date are computed using reported earnings); and railroad and military earnings indicators. however, there is not a single moment at which a widow considers marriage, so we picked a fixed age. if an eligible widow claims benefits at age 60, she will receive a monthly benefit amount equal to 71. for example, women who were married to men who were not fully insured under social security will not face penalties for remarriage. the number of marriages on the 60th birthday is only 17 percent higher than the baseline month and not statistically different than the baseline.. divorced spouses receiving survivor benefits lose their claim to widow survivor benefits if they remarry before age 55. also, social security rules allow a fully insured widow to claim a reduced widow benefit before the nra and then switch to a full retired-worker benefit at the nra (if it is higher). a widow(er) is eligible to receive benefits if she or he is at least age 60. we exclude women who were fully insured; some of these women may face a lower marriage penalty because, regardless of marriage , they may receive retired-worker benefits for most of their retirement years., we simulate the present discounted value of the future stream of social security benefits, as if people in this group had not remarried before age 60. measure marriage penalties in social security we use former child-in-care widow beneficiaries who remarried prior to age 60 and who claimed spouse benefits on the records of new husbands in the period of january 1997 to june 1998. in 1979, there was an increase in the marriage rate of widows 60 or older. since 1984, the civil service, foreign service, and federal retirement systems suspended survivor benefits if a remarriage occurred before age 55.
Social Security and Elderly Poverty
. for those born before 1940, the nra for widow(er) benefits is age 65. since its inception, there have been increases to the maximum income subject to social security payroll taxes, which has resulted in higher earnings amounts being stored in the mef.: the numerator is the weighted number of marriages in the age category and year from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. however, a former child-in-care widow can reestablish entitlement on her deceased husband's work record as early as age 60 as a widow beneficiary, provided she is unmarried or her marriage occurred after she reached age 60. we also include year dummies to account for the possibility of a time trend in marriage counts, with the omitted category of 1968. instead, two new postings are created: one includes a negative amount to offset the original wage report, and the other includes the new, correct amount. yelowitz (1998) also finds a negative correlation between medicaid eligibility and marriage. widowed spouses of military retirees who remarry before age 55 lose their claim to survivor benefits. if wages were less than the oasdi taxable maximum, then the employee was required to pay oasdi taxes on any self-employment income up to the oasdi taxable maximum. also, not all of the complexities of the social security program are reflected in the simulations. this group, we first simulate each woman's present discounted value of the future stream of benefits at the time she reached age 60. self-employment earnings information was first collected in 1951 when nonfarm self-employed workers (except members of professional groups) were added to the social security program. there are many reasons why the marriage patterns of widows might be different than those of divorced women. as a result, 1994 is the firstyear in which earnings data provide a full accounting for wage and salary, tip, and self-employment income. this suggests that, on average, the law change did not have significant effects on widows under age 60, but we investigate this further in future regressions. smith and others (1991) analyze the remarriage patterns of widows and widowers using panel study of income dynamics data. as shown in the top panel of figure 3, all the time periods after the 1979 law change (including 1979 through 1995) reveal a large relative decline in marriage rates at age 59 and a relative increase in marriage rates at age 60 for widowed women. one month before the 60th birthday, the marriage count is 72 percent lower than the baseline month (this is the largest deviation from the baseline). "social security, economic growth, and the rise in elderly widows' independence in the twentieth century. income tax system penalizes marriage for couples with similar incomes (their joint tax liability is higher as married couples than as unmarried individuals) and subsidizes marriage for couples with dissimilar incomes. when different eins were used for each agency, some earnings were posted twice. on an annual basis, this is close to the 3 percent real rate of return that the social security trust funds are projected to earn (board of trustees 1999). second, since 1984, women who are divorced after 10 years of marriage and whose ex-spouses are deceased face similar penalties to widows. this was not obvious in the first set of empirical tests because we categorized all under age 60 marriage rates with a single dummy variable. before 1984, these rules applied to civil service employees for any marriage before age 60. effective 1 april 1999, this provision has been deleted, so that survivors benefits are not discontinued upon remarriage. michigan, ohio, and south carolina belong to the mra but do not report previous marital status on their marriage certificates..The current law requires that the widow be unmarried in order to claim widow benefits, unless the marriage occurred after the widow attained age 60. these data include regular wages and salaries, tips, self-employment income, and deferred compensation (contributions or distributions)., our simulations show that the size of the penalties for early remarriage can be quite substantial. percent) to their irs-reported net earnings to determine their social security and medicare taxable net earnings (ssa 2009c, chapter 12).
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aged widow(er) benefits are paid by the federal government to persons whose deceased spouses worked in social security covered employment.. 95-216, beginning in 1978, ssa began collecting wage and salary information directly from employers on the form w-2 wage and tax statement on an annual basis. conditional on meeting a potential spouse, the cost of waiting decreases and the benefit increases as she approaches age 60. beginning in 1991, there is a difference between the maximum amount of earnings covered under social security and the medicare program. because husbands from low-income families tend to die at younger ages, the widows who are subject to these penalties are most likely to be economically vulnerable. in particular, it is not clear that a couple who cohabit at age 59 should be treated differently than a couple who marry at age 59. (1996) investigates the cohabitation patterns of individuals age 60 or older using census data. corson, director of the bureau of old-age insurance, noted "[a]s a byproduct of its necessary operations, the records of the bureau of old-age insurance will in [the] future provide a wealth of new sources of information regarding the working population of the united states. using very large samples of marriages, we find the social security rule that penalizes remarriage before age 60 affects the marriage patterns of widows."indeed, one of the many things people don't know about social security is how drastically it can be affected by marital status.. for 1978 to 1990, self-employment income is included only to the extent that it is taxable under the social security program. the importance of these files is that they show employee and employer location (county and state) and the employer's type of industry, since wages are reported at the employer level in the detail segment of the mef (panis and others 2000). we do not see any significant patterns around age 55 or the year 1984, which may be due to the fact that each of these groups typically include fewer than 5 percent of the labor force (u. if the widow waits until she reaches age 60 to marry, she can collect, at that age, a monthly widow benefit of 5 on her first husband's record. under current law, there is no penalty if the remarriage occurs at 60 years of age or later.. the 200,000 and 575,000 figures are based on tabulations from the 1990 survey of income and program participation and have been adjusted to reflect growth in the aged female population that has occurred since 1990.. this legislation also allowed a small beneficiary group, disabled widow(er)s and disabled surviving divorced spouses, aged 50 or older, to remarry without loss of benefits. the initial detail posting, called the primary wage posting, will contain two dollar values: wages subject to federal income taxes (including amounts paid under deferred-compensation plans) and oasdi-taxable earnings. starting in 2004, ssa began to capture information on the specific type of deferred compensation (for example, a 401(k), 403(b), or 457(b) pension plan) and wages that were put into health savings accounts (hsas). we have attributed this change to remarriage rules embedded in the social security system. social security act stipulated who would be covered by the program, meaning those who would pay into the system while working and then receive benefits in retirement. qcs and the quarterly pattern in which wages were earned are also available for each year of data; however, qcs were allocated by different methods, depending on the type of earnings, during this period. in july of 1965, legislation passed that allowed widows to remarry after age 60 and keep an amount equal to half of the deceased spouse's pia. categorical eligibility requirement of the welfare system traditionally created large disincentives for marriage. in the time period from 1979 to 1995, there is a flat trend in marriage counts in the months preceding the 60th birthday and a much less pronounced increase at their 60th birthday. like widow benefits, spouse benefits are actuarially reduced if claimed before the nra—at age 62 a spouse receives 37. individuals who have military service earnings from active duty from 1957 through 2001 can receive special extra earnings credits that are added to their social security records. in 1995, for example, the poverty rate of widows aged 65 or older was 19. control for time trends and test the statistical significance of these trends using a straightforward regression analysis:At least age 60 dummy..10 there are instances in the mef when nongovernmental workers appear to have mqge wages because their reported medicare taxable wages are greater than their social security wages and the latter is less than the oasdi taxable maximum. standard economic theory of marriage suggests that individuals choose to marry when the utility associated with being married exceeds the utility when single (becker 1973, 1974).
More older couples shacking up, skipping marriage -
for more information on average wages for indexing during this time period, see clingman and kunkel (1992). economic theory that suggests that economic incentives should influence marriage decisions, existing literature finds mixed results. if widows who are delaying their marriage to avoid the penalty are cohabiting with their partner in the meantime, the concerns about well-being may be less well founded. this may not be a major concern because more than 90 percent of men are fully insured under social security (u. this proposal is of a slightly larger scale—currently, there are about 575,000 married women, aged 60 or older, who were once widows and who remarried prior to age 60. before 1991, the irs sent self-employment earnings data to ssa only when those earnings were reported as social security taxable. each widow has a financial benefit of waiting until she is 60 years old to remarry, which is the difference in the present discounted values of the social security benefits for marrying later and marrying now. as shown in the top panel of figure 5, during the 1979 to 1995 period the peak number of marriages for widows in this 24-month range is the month of the woman's 60th birthday, with especially high counts in the three months following a woman's 60th birthday. the cost of remarriage at any age above 60 years decreased after the law change, so this increase for those who were at least age 60 implies that women actually avoided marriage before the law. at age 60, the present discounted value of the widow's social security benefits is approximately ,000 if she does not wait to marry, versus 2,000 if she does wait to marry. additionally, beginning in 2000, all workers and former workers aged 25 or older receive an annual social security statement that lists by year all social security and medicare earnings that have been posted to the mef to date. an examination of marriage rates by age confirms this story—a delay in marriage at age 59 and an increase in marriage rates after that age. however, the possibility of cohabitation raises concerns about the equity of the social security marriage penalty. we narrow our focus to widows, rather than widowers, because the overwhelming percentage of survivor benefits are paid to women (over 98 percent). if a retiree has not reached his or her full retirement age and earns more than a specified amount in a year (in 2009, the amount is ,160), benefits are reduced for every over the earnings limit (the reductions are offset with an increase in benefits when the retiree reaches full retirement age). thus, even fully insured widows face a marriage penalty because they lose their claims to these options if they remarry before age 60. gelardi (1996) shows that law changes in canada, england, and wales also influenced the timing of marriages. beginning in 1979, the year the marriage penalty was removed for those at least age 60, we can reject the hypothesis that the percent differences from the baseline year are the same at standard significance levels for virtually all years (the only exception is 1992).. divorced spouses of federal employees who are awarded a survivor annuity lose the benefit permanently upon remarriage before age 55.. the social security administration computes a person's pia based on the person's average earnings in social security covered employment.. an employee of the united nations joint staff pension fund acknowledged marriage penalties in their pension plan: "[f]or over fifty years a provision in our rules & regulations called for the discontinuance of benefits to a surviving spouse upon remarriage. compiled by the nchs, the vs data contain annual marriage certificate data from states in the marriage-registration areas (mra) between 1968 and 1995. 1966 through 1990, the hi payroll tax was collected on earnings up to the social security taxable maximum. better coordination among federal agencies could reduce unidentified earnings reports. social security act amendments of 1950: a summary and legislative history. what does fica mean and why are social security taxes called fica contributions? denominator is number of divorced women in the age category and year in all states.. couples with high marriage penalties are more likely to delay marriage into the following tax year. however, under some circumstances, divorced women face marriage incentives similar to widows. therefore, we next look at single-age marriage rates for different birth cohorts of women, using the 1979 law change as our source of identification. online social security handbook: your basic guide to the social security programs.
Getting Social Security Disability After Age 65 (Before Full
a widow contemplating marriage prior to age 60 would discount the streams of income to that point in time. the medicare coverage rules are different from those for the oasdi program, the mef contains information on earnings subject to the medicare tax but not also to the oasdi tax. year employers and the internal revenue service (irs) send information to the social security administration (ssa) on the earnings of the u. if cohabitation is increasingly a substitute for legal marriage among the elderly, it is not clear that a cohabiting couple should receive different social security benefits than a legally married couple.. for people born after 1928, 40 "quarters" of work in social security covered employment are necessary for fully insured status. for example, for an individual reaching full retirement age in 2009, benefits are reduced for every of earnings above ,680. evidence that the age-60 social security rule influences behavior requires a large data set to ensure sufficient sample sizes within age and marital status categories. the average pia of men retiring in 1998 was about ,000 (u. divorced women who are at least age 60, the marriage rates in 1977, 1978, and 1979 are 20, 24, and 10 percent below the marriage rate for the baseline year of 1968. we use data from the 36 states that were continuously in the mra between 1968 and 1995 and that record previous marital status on their marriage certificate. million of whom were close to age 60 (55 to 64 years old) (lugaila 1998). finally, as noted above, the results that show changes in marriage patterns around the 1979 law change, which did not affect these pension benefits, suggest that it is the social security law that is affecting the behavior. the mandatory survivor annuity may not be terminated upon remarriage (p. this is a difficult task because we need complete social security information on the widow, her deceased husband, and her current husband. additional groups of self-employed workers and professionals were added through legislation passed in 1954, 1956, and 1965 (more information appears in the self-employment earnings section). wyrick, claimed to have uncovered anecdotal evidence that the social security system influenced the marriage behavior of the elderly. first in a series of subcommittee hearings on social security number high-risk issues (november 1). mef data are used extensively, but are mainly used for calculating social security benefits for individuals and any auxiliary beneficiaries they may have. this is already the earliest age at which a disabled widow(er) beneficiary may remarry without loss of benefits. that is, if they had remarried after age 60, we expect that they would be receiving widow benefits rather than spouse benefits because widow benefits tend to be higher. safeguards are established in accordance with the ssa systems security handbook to protect individuals' records. baltimore, md: social security administration, office of the chief actuary. our first piece of evidence, the top panel of figure 1 examines the average marriage rates by year for two age groups of widows (ages 50 to 59 and 60 to 70) between 1968 and 1995. average wages for 1985–1990 for indexing under the social security act. baltimore, md: social security administration, office of the chief actuary. current system reflects a series of law changes, beginning in 1965, that altered the marriage penalties in social security. concern, however, is that something other than social security drives our results. this suggests that widows age 60 or older delayed marriages in 1978 in anticipation of the law becoming effective. they break the data into two samples, using age 60 as the division point, which prohibits any insights into how the age-60 rule in social security affects behavior., at least two papers consider whether economic status influences the marriage or cohabitation decisions of the elderly. a widow(er) is eligible to receive benefits if she or he is at lease age 60.
Big penalties await those who delay Medicare filing | Reuters
for ssa to accept the wage amounts on the w-2s, their cumulative total must agree with the w-3. earnings data are used to administer the social security programs and to conduct research on the populations served by those programs. this suggests many widows in this age group chose not to marry until the marriage penalty they faced was removed. second, there are efficiency losses if social security causes women to bypass opportunities to marry simply because of the penalty implicit in the system. these wages were reported for each worker up to the taxable maximum (fay and wasserman 1938). doug wolf and dan black provided much encouragement of our work. ordinary least squares of ln(monthly marriage count) on months from 60 th birthday, interaction between post-1979 law change and months from 60 th birthday; and year for widows and divorced women. a secondary wage posting for hi-taxable earnings would have
Social Security Benefits On Exs Record |
for divorced women whose ex-husbands are not deceased, remarriage at any age results in a termination of benefits. marriage incentives in the welfare and income tax systems receive the most attention in the literature. their claim will be reinstated if the marriage ends because of death, divorce, or annulment. this suggests that widows may delay or avoid marriage if they are very close to being able to marry without a penalty on their social security widow benefits. much of our analysis, we create marriage "rates" by previous marital status and age using vs data as the numerator. they find no evidence that economic well-being influences remarriage decisions. numident records are updated when an individual reports a name change (usually from marriage), requests a correction, asks for a replacement for a lost card, or dies. investigate whether the age-60 remarriage rule affects the timing of marriage and whether the elimination of the marriage penalty in 1979 encouraged widows 60 or older to marry.. technically, from a social security perspective, a widow attains age 60 "the first moment" of the day before her 60th birthday. there are only about 200,000 married women, aged 60 or older, who were once widows and who remarried in their 50s. for example, under current law, social security benefits may change purely with a change in legal marital status. aged widow(er) benefits are paid by the federal government to persons whose deceased spouses worked in social security covered employment. in addition, ssa began converting files to microfilm in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the installation of the first computer in 1956 greatly increased the use of magnetic tape at the agency (cronin 1985). in the 1939 amendments, the taxing provisions were taken out of the social security act and placed in the internal revenue code as the federal insurance contributions act (fica) (ssa 2009e). however, we argue that any observed changes in trends for the groups around age 60 and the 1979 law change are due to the social security policy., the above results suggest a change in remarriage behavior for widows around age 60. the same trough before the 60th birthday still exists, with 54 percent fewer marriages in the month before the 60th birthday relative to the baseline month, and this is statistically different than the spike at the 60th birthday [f(1,1248)=4. we regress the log marriage rate on year dummies, omitting 1968; an interaction term between each year and a dummy for whether the marriage rate is for women at least age 60; and, dummies for each age category, omitting the age-50 category. 'at least she's smart enough to check it out ahead of time,' says leslie walker, a spokeswoman with the social security administration in san francisco, 'i just dealt with a couple where she was a teacher and he was a government employee (two groups that generally can't claim social security on their own records). with 28 years of data and 21 age groups we have 588 observations. a person who has worked enough in covered employment to be fully insured is eligible to receive a retired-worker benefit from social security as early as age 62. in order to assign earnings to a specific individual, the ssb established social security numbers (ssns) to allow employers to uniquely identify, and accurately report, earnings covered under the new program. the tradeoff with this goal is the delay or avoidance of marriage.. we draw data from social security records extracted in july of 1998 and exclude women who were fully insured in their own right. this allows the patterns in marriage rates to vary as the widows approach age 60. w-3 is a summary form that contains aggregate earnings information for all employees in the wage report. because social security benefits are based on an individual's earnings record, self-employed workers receive less credit for earnings in 1990 and later because of the factor applied to adjust their irs net earnings by the amounts of oasdi and medicare payroll taxes due. unlike the widows, the marriage counts on the 60th birthday are below the baseline month before and after the law change. in addition, there are no differences between the effects of the age 58-, 59-, or 60-year-old dummies. expansion of social security coverage: additional types of workers covered, by date of authorizing legislation. formalize this analysis with a regression similar to the ones above:At least age 60 dummy. in the irs field and ,000 in the oasdi/hi field representing hi-taxable earnings above the oasdi-taxable maximum. among divorced women who are under age 60, the marriage rates decline significantly between 1979 (29 percent below the baseline) and 1980 (47 percent below the baseline) [f(1,513)=3. to calculate the present discounted value, at age 60, of a monthly benefit amount paid j months after the date the person turns 60, we divide the real monthly benefit amount by (1. we hypothesize that the 1979 law would decrease the marriage rate for women under age 60 and increase the marriage rate for women aged 60 years or older. since 1979, the amount of earnings needed for each qc has increased annually, proportional to the national average wage. as previously discussed, the social security taxable maximum is indexed to the growth rate in the national average wage. the primary wage posting would show irs-taxable earnings of 0,000 in the irs taxable field and oasdi-taxable earnings of ,000 in the oasdi/hi field. even if spouse benefits were relatively high, we expect that they would have claimed widow benefits at ages 60 to 62 (ages when spouse benefits cannot be claimed). for the 60- to 70-year-olds, we show a decrease in the marriage rate following the 1977 passage of the law. after the computerized routines are applied, approximately 96 percent of wage items are successfully posted to the mef (gao 2005). authors also consider the possibility that taxes affect the timing of marriage.. these women are at least 62 years old, in order to file for spousal benefits, so they are from slightly earlier birth cohorts than current middle-aged widows..In this section, we provide some perspective on how large the actual penalties are likely to be for widows who remarry before age 60. first note the downward trend in the marriage rate over these years, which is consistent with marriage rates for all ages. the suspension of benefits does not occur if the widow is younger than age 55 and was married for at least 30 years, and benefits are restored if the remarriage ends because of death, divorce, or annulment. evidence reportedly influenced policymakers enough to lead to the 1965 law change that lowered the marriage penalty in social security. for all of our present value calculations, we first deflate the pias to the time the remarried widows turned age 60, using a 3 percent annual rate of inflation. dependent variable is the natural log of single-age and year marriage rates for 50 to 70 year old widows. alm and whittington (1995 and 1999) and whittington and alm (1997) find that the larger the tax penalty on marriage, the less likely an individual is to marry and the more likely a couple is to divorce. for covered wages and tips, a qc was credited for each quarter in which the employee had or more in earnings, up to four qcs a year. the top panel of figure 2 shows that there are slight increases in the marriage rates of divorced women in 1979. each of these age effects are statistically different than one another at the 1 percent level. unfortunately, these data lack information on income and social security eligibility. marriage rate patterns for divorced women do not exhibit the trends shown for widows.
Dating after age 65 social security
(2004). The Desire to Date and Remarry among Older Widows and
after 1951, if an employee's combined wages from two or more employers exceeds the taxable maximum, the record includes wages exceeding the maximum. denominator is number of widows in the age category and year in all states..When the detail segment process was established in 1978, only two amounts were taken from the w-2: oasdi-taxable earnings (to be added into each person's summary earnings record) and the irs-taxable wage (to be reported on form 1040 and used in calculating the national average wage). the annual earnings amounts are then indexed using the national average wage index (awi) series, to ensure that benefits reflect the general rise in u. social security claiming rules will change and impact some baby boomers. there are optional reporting procedures for the self-employed that allow them to claim ,600 in earnings for social security purposes even in years when they had net earnings of less than 0. we do not observe this pattern in the period before 1979, and we do not observe it for divorced women, who generally are not subject to the age-60 remarriage rule. in the pre- and post-1979 law change periods, the trends in marriage rates relative to the baseline age of 50 years, are statistically the same for all age groups up to and including the 58-year-old widows. in fact, marriage rates decrease monotonically around age 60 in the post-1979 law change period. specifically, under current law, surviving divorced spouses lose eligibility if remarriage occurs before age 60. as another example, the penalty may be inequitable if knowledge of the marriage penalty implicit in social security is not universal. "the marriage tax and the rate and timing of marriage. our empirical specification, we test the following three hypotheses:H1: the 1979 law eliminated the penalty for remarriage after age 60, thereby raising the benefit of waiting for widows under 60 and reducing the cost of remarriage at age 60 or older. in vs data, we find evidence that in 1979, the year that the penalty for remarriage was reduced for those at least age 60, the marriage rate for this group increased. recall that prior to 1979 there was still some incentive to wait until age 60 because of the difference between keeping 50 percent of widow benefits for a marriage after age 60 versus zero widow benefits for a marriage before age 60. findings and conclusions presented in the bulletin are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the social security administration.. even at the 75th percentile, a widow who marries early will receive only about 80 percent of the amount she could have received and, at the 25th percentile, a widow will receive less than 60 percent of the amount she would have received if she had delayed her marriage. these appear to be reporting errors, but are stored on the mef as if they are medicare wages in excess of social security wages. this paper we focus on an age restriction for remarriage to determine if individuals respond to economic incentives for remarriage. unlike the post-law period, the age-59 effect is not statistically different than the age-60 effect (84 percent below the baseline). if a widow(er) remarries before age 60, she or he forfeits the benefit and, therefore, faces a marriage penalty. this article "covered earnings" refers to those from employment covered by social security or, more specifically, old-age, survivors, and disability insurance (oasdi). therefore, our identification strategy for investigating the effect of the age-60 social security rule on marriage is a comparison of marriage patterns before and after the 1979 law change, which eliminated the marriage penalty if the marriage occurred after reaching age 60, and a comparison of widows to divorced women. least squares of ln(marriage rate) on age and interaction between post-1979 law change and year for widows and divorced women. however, the number of marriages taking place on the 60th birthday is 56 percent higher than the baseline month. of october 2007, 275 million wage items for tax years 1937 to 2005 were in the esf, amounting to 1 billion in wages for which social security taxes have been paid (ssa 2009b). a new public-use earnings data file based on a 1-percent random sample of workers is currently being developed in ssa's office of retirement and disability policy (ordp) for dissemination on the social security web site..Other major changes to the program, such as the creation of medicare in 1965, required new information to be added to the mef. more closely at widows over age 60, we see that in 1977 their marriage rate was 2 percent below the baseline year and in 1978, the year after the law passed, the marriage rate was 13 percent lower than the baseline year.. 101-239 changed the calculation of the national average wage to include certain types of deferred-compensation plans for years after 1991. this literature considers two related questions: do taxes or transfers affect the decision of whether or not to be married, and do taxes or transfers affect the timing of marriage?
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the marriage rate at age 59 is 86 percent below the baseline age of 50, while the marriage rate at age 58 is only 68 percent below the baseline age. assume that she files for the spouse benefit from her second husband's record at age 62.: numerator is weighted number of marriages among divorced women in the age category and year from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. the marriage rate was still above the baseline in 1980, but only by 2 percent. our results provide compelling evidence that widows respond to economic incentives—delaying or forgoing marriage when the costs for such behavior are high. trends in elective deferrals of earnings from 1990–2001 in social security administrative data. dependent variable is the natural log of single-age, marriage rates for widows between the ages of 50 and 70. we investigate whether this rule affects the marriage behavior of widows. for information on the social security statement, see http://www.: weighted number of marriages among widows in the month and year category. the past 35 years, congress has eased the social security marriage penalties. the data for some states come from a random sample of their marriage certificates, while other states report their complete population of marriage certificates. lack of formal evidence of a relationship between social security and remarriage is even more surprising given the great deal of attention paid to the possibility that other government policies influence marriage decisions. these differences are statistically significant and show that the law decreased the marriage rates of 59-year-olds and increased the marriage rate of women who were at least age 60. he reported that a large number of elderly couples cohabited (rather than legally marry) to avoid the penalties in social security. one place these data are available is social security administrative data on child-in-care widow benefit beneficiaries. in addition to the marriage date, and critical for this analysis, the vs data include age and previous marital status of the people getting married. these are only from states that were in the mra for all years between 1968 and 1995 and that reported previous marital status on their marriage certificates. the social security rules on remarriage have changed over time. receives information on employee wages from the employer on form w-2 wage and tax statement and form w-3 transmittal of wage and tax statements, and on self-employment earnings from irs data files derived from schedule se and the unreported wages and tips line item on form 1040, u. this further reduced the penalty for remarriage for those at least age 60 and increased the incentive to delay remarriage until age 60. in 1984, earnings reports began to include elective deferrals for those workers with wages below the taxable maximum, although deferrals were not explicitly identified and the information was incomplete (pattison and waldron 2008). larger change in the system occurred in december of 1977, allowing widows (but not surviving divorced spouses) to remarry after age 60 and to still claim a full widow benefit. ordinary least squares of ln(marriage rate) on year, age and interaction between year and at least age 60 for widows and divorced women. one, 2, and 3 months following the 60th birthday, the number of marriages are still 52, 36, and 25 percent higher than the baseline month. also, in the post-1979 period, there was a drop in marriage rates immediately prior to age 60 and an increase after this age. similarly, earnings from self-employment were added to any employee wages and recorded as a yearly total in the mef during this period. the views expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily represent the position of the social security administration. second, an informal survey of employee benefit specialists and financial planners turned up no evidence that pension plans include this age-60 stipulation. finally, our estimates use age 60 as a baseline to do the present value calculations..H2: the cost of waiting decreases and the benefit increases as a widow approaches 60, therefore the marriage rate should decrease as widows approach age 60.
Social Security Working and Benefits for Seniors - the social security amendments of 1983 increased the self-employment tax rate to match the combined employee-employer social security and medicare tax rates effective january 1, 1984 (general accounting office 1983). the 1972 social security amendments provided for annual increases in the taxable maximum, proportional to the increase in the national average wage, beginning in 1975. thus, a former child-in-care widow faces the remarriage incentives we have discussed. another proposal for reducing the marriage penalties would be to disregard all marriages, regardless of the ages at which they occurred. fica taxes (also called payroll taxes) continue to be withheld from wages and earnings up to the taxable maximum, which has increased over the past 70 years. addition to changing coverage laws, changes to the social security program and social security-related tax laws have also affected the information contained in the mef (see chart 2). our data have only women who marry, ignoring those individuals who perhaps decline opportunities for remarriage to avoid paying the penalty. of the discussion in this section focuses on widows who are under the age of 60 and who were married to persons who worked in social security covered employment.: divorced women do not face such high benefits by waiting until age 60; therefore, these same patterns should not exist for them. of the two ee-er files, one contains covered wages only and the other contains both covered and noncovered wages (this includes nontaxable wages and hi-only taxable wages and covered employment). the social security amendments of 1950 changed the benefit calculation to increase monthly benefits payable (cohen and myers 1950). this increased the amount of earnings reported to ssa for those who had earnings above the social security taxable maximum, and greatly increased the amount of self-employment earnings records in the mef. to the social security act have not only increased the number and types of workers covered by the program, they have also necessitated changing the types of earnings information that are collected by ssa.. a large literature attempts to measure the influence of government programs, such as social security and old-age assistance, on the increase in the number of elderly (widows in particular) who live alone. in a regression analysis comparable to that above, shown in the bottom panel of figure 2 and appendix table 1, we find that the deviations from the baseline year are significantly different for divorced women who are at least age 60 relative to those women who are under age 60 in 1970, 1971, 1975, 1976, 1980, and 1981. as noted earlier, in order for the earnings on these wage reports to be posted to the mef, the combination of the name and ssn on form w-2 must be matched to the numident. social security pays benefits to nonaged women who are caring for the minor (or disabled) children of deceased husbands who worked in covered employment. weaver is with the office of policy, social security administration..29 there are two exceptions to posting earnings to the mef when the name and ssn match the numident: when the numident record contains a death indicator, and when the numident date of birth indicates that the individual is under age 7. hu (1998), for example, finds no consistent effect of welfare benefit levels on the likelihood of marriage relative to cohabitation. obviously, there is a wide range of costs and benefits that influence the marriage decision. another limitation arises from the existence of the esf, which includes wage reports that could not be entered into the mef. the switch to form w-2 also meant that ssa had access to information, such as wages above the taxable maximum and wages from noncovered employment, it had not previously received. second, social security pays a lower rate for a spouse benefit than a widow benefit. because these beneficiaries are recently entitled, our measured penalties approximate the size of the penalties that middle-aged widows currently face. the amount of the retired-worker benefit depends on the pia from one's own work record and on the age at which it is first received. discounting to a point in time prior to age 60 would reduce the dollar amounts, but would not change the distribution of ratios in table 1.: the cost of waiting decreases and the benefit increases as a widow approaches 60, therefore the marriage rate should decrease as widows approach age 60. one, two and three months following the 60th birthday, the number of marriages are still 21, 22, and 26 percent lower (not higher, like in the post-1979 law period) than the baseline month. the median ratio of the present value associated with early marriage to the value associated with delayed marriage is 0. for more information on the history of coverage, see myers (1993).
Are Women Done With Men After Age 55? | Dalrock noncovered earnings were not reported to ssa in the early years of social security because they were not needed for program purposes. the law tasked ssa's predecessor, the social security board (ssb), with obtaining earnings information in order to calculate benefit amounts in retirement. currently, married persons represent about 350,000, or 4 percent, of all social security aged survivor beneficiaries. social security administration (ssa) receives reports of earnings for the u. however, their measure of economic well-being—the income-to-needs ratio—does not differentiate between sources of income, such as social security, which might have differential effects on remarriage probabilities. therefore, when she files for a widow benefit on the second husband's record she receives 100 percent of the pia, or ,000, for the remaining 65 months of her life (social security will not pay her both widow benefits, only the higher one). weak support of our earlier claim, there is not a significant change in the marriage rate of divorced women following the 1984 law change that treated surviving divorced spouses like widows. average wages for indexing under the social security act and the automatic determinations for 1979–81. clearly, the calculations refer to the penalties of early marriage versus postponed marriage and ignore the counterfactual of remaining unmarried. initially, taxable wage reports for individual workers were sent by the irs' forerunner, the bureau of internal revenue, to ssb and, later, to ssa..: board of trustees of the federal old-age and survivors insurance and disability insurance trust funds.